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Abstract 
The present study aims to comprehend the nature of drop out from the microfinance institutes (MFIs) in 
Bangladesh. To this aim, the research incorporates several variables ranging from the demographic to demand-
led factors that may affect the dropping out behavior of the rural poor in MFIs. Multiple regression model has 
been used to analyze the data (n = 280) that are collected from the dropout-members from six regions of 
Bangladesh. The findings demonstrate that eleven of fourteen explanatory variables including the demographics 
are statistically significant to influence the dropping out behavior of the dropouts in rural Bangladesh.    
Keywords: Dropouts, factors of dropping out, demand-led factors, MFIs and Bangladesh 
Introduction 
Microfinance, pioneered by Professor Muhammad Yunus as microcredit, has been trumpeted as a champion over 
the last three decades for attaining the global objectives of alleviating rural poverty and improving women’s 
socioeconomic status (Ashraf, 2013; Karim, 2011). Until now, there have been a large number of empirical and 
quasi-empirical evidences which support this view on positive role of microfinance institutes (MFIs) in poverty 
alleviation such as Hossain (1984, 1986, 1988, 1989), Khandker (1996, 1998), Pitt and Khandker (1995, 1998),  
Hashemi, Schuler and Reley (1996), Zohir  (2001), Khandker (2003), Razzaque (2010) and many others. 
However, this trumpeted role of microfinance appears to be dull to this day (Karim, 2011) because of the 
criticisms which stem from different issues such as economic impact (Morduch, 1998, 1999; Hulme and Mosley, 
1996; Haque and Yamao, 2008; Khosa, 2007) and social impact on women’s status (Rahman, 1996; Rahman, 
1999; Fernando, 2006; Muhammad, 2006). 
 
In the recent past, several MFIs have begun using a management tool, developed by Assessing the Impact of 
Microenterprise Services (AIMS) at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to assess 
impact (Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan, 2009). This tool advocates comparing current members to new 
members of a microcredit program and attributes any difference to the impact of the program. The tool 
introduces a potential source of bias into estimates of impact by not instructing organizations to include program 
dropouts in their calculations. In these data, not including dropouts overestimates the impact of the credit 
program. This fact indicates that though the issue of dropouts in MFIs is systematically overlooked, the rate of 
dropouts is evidently very high and remained unexplored in detail (Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan, 2009). 
Nonetheless, there has been scanty research on this very issue of dropouts in MFIs. 
Most empirical works on microfinance employed households as sampling units and enumerated to program-
controlled comparison. However, sociologists and gender specialists focus on member-specific participation of 
the rural poor in MFIs. Both cases --- whether it was for members or households --- are prevalent in qualifying 
the variable of participation and particularly the length of participation which characterizes the membership that 
grows at almost two-digit level until the first decade of the new millennium (CDF, 2012).  
 
This quick growth of membership has, in fact, generated a fuzzy view on participation of the rural poor in MFIs 
obscuring the micro-level snapshots of voluntary or involuntary “dropout” from the system of microlending 
(Ashraf, 2013). While some researchers interpreted this dropout as an outcome of “graduation” of the rural poor 
from the status of poor to rich, others articulated it in terms of the overall inability of MFIs to keep the rural poor 
members engaged in borrowing activities. In relation to this confusion, it is imperative that the nature of 
dropouts of the rural poor from the membership of MFIs be better understood, for better monitoring and 
interactive policy designs (Ashraf, 2011; Zohir, 2001).  
 
The prime objective of this paper is, thus, to understand the nature of dropouts as well as to identify the factors 
that affect the dropouts of the poor villagers from the membership of MFIs in Bangladesh. The plan for the paper 
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is as follows: Next to the introduction, the relevant literature is briefly reviewed in the context of microfinance 
participation and dropouts in recent times. Then, the research model and hypotheses are presented, followed by a 
discussion of the research method and findings from the data analysis. A discussion of the meaning of the results 
and their implications bring the paper to the end which delineates the directions of further research in 
microfinance field along with concluding remarks finally.  
Microfinance Participation and Dropouts: Past Research 
Microfinance is well-known to deliberately target the poorer section of the rural population, especially poor 
village women. The most common criterion used in this process is that only households with less than half an 
acre of cultivable land including homestead area are eligible to participate in MFIs to borrow. However, some 
important questions remain who participate in MFIs to have micro loans and who do not (Osmani and Khalily, 
2011). Nonetheless, there have been evidence that many of the rural poor who do not presently participating in 
MFIs, they participated before. This segment of the rural poor is defined as dropouts whose numbers have 
recently emerged as potential limitation to MFIs (Karim, 2005).    
   
In a recent study, Karim (2005) finds in a survey that as high as 42.5 percent of the participants in the case of 
Grameen Bank in certain areas of Bangladesh are dropped out. Among these dropouts, 72.6 percent do not 
further participate in any other MFIs and they are subsisting under the poverty line. Similar findings are also 
available in Khan and Chowdhury (1995) who observe that about 75. 7 percent of the dropped out borrowers of 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) have not been involved further in other MFIs. However, 
Zohir (2001) undertook an investigation surveying in thirteen districts of Bangladesh and found that about 15 
percent of the sample of 1921 participants dropped out from MFIs. 
 
Latifee (2005) reports that dropout is a common problem faced by most MFIs. Consequently, it threatens the 
viability and sustainability of the microfinance programs which, in the long run, may not be able to keep them 
under control. Hence, the MFIs should try to be proactive in finding out why their clientele drop out, how costly 
and damaging it is for their programs, and how they can prevent or reduce dropout rates; and in doing so, protect 
themselves from its negative impact. 
 
Majumder (2009) explores a microfinance institution and reports that almost 82% of dropouts admit to have 
voluntarily terminated their memberships and about 11 percent state that the organization rescinds their 
memberships after loan repayment. These statistics of voluntary dropouts point to the growing freedom of choice 
exercised by the clientele today. It also suggests that with better service the organization can appeal to the 
clientele’s preference, thereby reducing the drop-out rate.  
 
Field-level investigation led by Datta (2004) reveals that the extreme poor have not been targeted specifically. 
The very few such households that have participated in these programs have been included accidentally rather 
than systematically. There are some selection criteria to target households that include address of permanent 
residence, age between 18 and 35 years and mandatory regular savings requirement. It has been found that some 
members lost their memberships not because of their failure to pay the installments, but because they lost their 
residences due to river erosion.  
 
Hashemi (1997) argues that the extreme poor do not have the ability to take risks and a majority of these poor do 
not initially want microcredit because they fear that they would be unable to repay the loans and would therefore 
be saddled with debt that would eventually force them to sell what few possessions they do have. Consequently, 
the poor become poorer once they involve in borrowing microfinance. 
 
It is no secret that current interest rates in microfinance programs are extremely high and along with high interest 
rates, weekly repayment procedures highly discourage extreme poor households from accepting microfinance 
loans (Mahmud, 2010). In this relation, Datta (2004) shows that while some of these types of households do have 
interest in receiving micro loans, most of these households cannot take the risks associated with borrowing. This 
risk averting attitude of the rural poor originates in their scanty resource-base in their ownership.      
This high interest rate has a practical implication of transforming microcredit to microfinance institutions which 
transformed their objective from maximizing social welfare to maximizing profit with the excuse of the 
argument of sustainability of MFIs (Elahi and Rahman, 2006). In this respect, Karim (2011) argues that there 
have been dramatic transformations of the NGOs to NGO-MFIs. For example, in 1990 there were only 59 NGOs 
that worked with microfinance; by 2006 and 2011, that number has risen to 2060 and to 3081 respectively 
(Karim, 2011, see Figure 1). 
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2014 
 
64 
Figure 1: Growth of NGO-MFIs in Bangladesh since 1990 
 
 
 
In many areas, religious conservatism is very high where women of extreme poor families do not join groups 
because of social and religious sanctions. These sanctions dictate that joining credit programs and leaving the 
poor women for meetings with other men is inappropriate. Group members also hesitate to allow the extreme 
poor to participate for fear that they lack money management skills. They are often transient families, moving in 
and out of villages looking for work (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010).     
Much has been made of the fact that MFIs in Bangladesh are failing to serve the extreme poor. This failure may 
result from dropouts from the system of microfinance scheme which is deemed to be a problem as serious as 
exclusion from membership in MFIs. In most cases, dropouts happen when borrowers fail to make suitable 
investment with the borrowed funds (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, dropouts have a link with loan default which may be voluntary or involuntary. And this default is 
in fact the result of failure to generate adequate return on the investment of borrowed funds. The inability to 
generate optimal return on investments may be due to low marginal product of capital, illness of working 
members, natural disasters, or mere lack of keen enthusiasm and motivation (Datta, 2004).  
 
Once the borrowers willingly decide to dropout from the microfinance programs, they do not repay the loan. 
Since timely repayment of loan is a precondition for having repeated loans, these types of default borrowers 
ultimately lose the chance of borrowing further. Hence, they become dissociated from the MFIs for ever. 
Besides, the dropout may occur due to inability to comply with the weekly group discipline such as group 
lending and meeting (Ashraf, 2013).       
Data and Research Method 
The data collection exercises were aimed at gathering information on the impact of member-specific factors that 
affect dropping outs of the rural poor from MFIs in Bangladesh. To this aim, data were collected based on 
stratified random sampling procedure by face to face interview from six major district-areas of Bangladesh 
namely Moulavibazar, Satkhira, Shariatpur, Kishoreganj, Nilphamary and Bogra using closed-end questionnaire 
interviewing 280 respondents who are dropouts from MFIs. The districts are selected based on the comparatively 
longer duration of the operations of the MFIs and the higher concentration of poverty incidence in Bangladesh 
declared by the concerned government departments (GoB, 2010). The questionnaire was constructed in a 5-point 
scale. In the measurement, scale 1 indicates strongly disagree and scale 5 indicates strongly agree. The samples 
were drawn based on snowballing sampling procedure. The sample statistics are shown in Table I. 
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In the sample statistics, a brief profile of the dropped-out respondents has been tapped.  Evidently, the majority 
of the dropped-outs are female members and 68 percent of them are between the age-group of 15 and 40. Most 
important among other information is that the majority of the respondents are illiterate and landless and 
marginally landless. Dropping out or nonparticipation in a targeted credit program is the outcome of both 
demand-led and supply-side factors (Datta, 2004). The former depends on the ex-post evaluation of eligible 
households about the costs and benefits of credit programs and the supply aspect relates the program-related 
constrains that the borrowers cannot overcome.    
 
The data were analyzed using multiple regression modeling to assess the factors influencing dropping outs from 
the MFIs in Bangladesh. As many researchers claim that self-identity i.e. demographic variables may be 
potentially responsible to affect the individual choice of dropping outs behavior of the borrowers in MFIs 
(Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2006; Karim, 2005; Datta, 2004; Zohir, 2001), the present study includes gender, 
age, education, yearly household income, total amount of land and the value of other assets as explanatory 
variables in addition to other eight demand-led factors such as fear of getting into risk of loans, individual 
preference, religious restriction on microfinance borrowing, spousal dislike to female head of households, 
friends advice, resource inadequacy, lack of knowledge or business skill and ill-health or vulnerability to crisis 
based on Mahmud (2000), Evans et al. (1999) and Ashraf (2013). Such a portrayal of the dropping out behavior 
is too simplistic since the choice is constrained and not entirely free. In order to identify certain explanatory 
variables, the study excludes some exogenous variables from the regression analysis such as savings, marital 
status of the borrowers, housing quality and consumption. 
The research also uses ANOVA and correlation measures. The descriptive statistics of the sample were provided 
in Table II. The results of correlation analyses were reported in Table III. And the results of regression analysis 
are provided in Table IV. All of these procedures have been commonly used in the study of participatory or non-
participatory behavior in general (Li, 2009; Phillips, 2009). In the regression analysis, eleven of fourteen 
variables are found statistically significant, two at the p < 0.10 level, five at the p < 0.05 and four at the p < 0.01 
level. 
 
The study employs the following multiple regression model: 
 
Yj = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 + β10X10 + β11X11 
 + β12X12 + β13X13 + β14X14 + ε 
 
Where, 
Yj = Dropping out (1 for current or past membership in MFIs, 0 otherwise) 
X1 = Gender 
X2 = Age 
X3 = Education 
X4 = Yearly income 
X5 = Amount of land 
X6 = Value of other assets 
X7 = Fears of getting into risk 
X8 = Individual preference 
X9 = Religious restriction on microfinance borrowing 
X10 = Spousal dislike of female head of household  
X11 = Friends’ advice 
X12 = Resource inadequacy 
X13 = Lack of Knowledge  
X14 = Ill-health or vulnerability to crisis 
ε = Error term; α, β1 …….. β14 = Parameters to be estimated 
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Table I Sample Statistics 
             Valid Percent 
Gender 
 Male                   13.8 
 Female                 86.2  
 
Age  
 15-25         11.2 
 26-40         56.4 
 41-55         23.1 
 56-60 and above         9.3 
 
Marital  Status 
 Single           9.3 
 Married        89.3 
 Divorced          1.7 
 
Education 
 Illiterate and Primary                              64 
 Secondary        26.7 
 Higher Secondary         5.5 
 Bachelor          3.8 
 
Yearly Household Income (in Taka) 
 0-20000        11 
 20001-40000        11.6 
 40001-70000        23.6 
 70001-100000        27.6 
 More than 100000       26.2 
 
Total Land including Home (in Decimal)  
 0         25 
 1-33         36.9 
 34-66         20 
 67-100         9.3 
 More than 100        8.8 
 
Other Assets (in Taka) 
 0-20000        60.2 
 20001-40000        4.5 
 40001-70000        7.6 
 70001-100000        6.7 
 More than 100000       21 
 
Results and Discussion 
As the main objective of this research is to tap the factors that are responsible for dropping out of the rural poor 
from the membership or the status of borrowers in the MFIs, the study includes eight independent factors in 
addition to the six demographic factors as their self-identity which may influence the dropping out behavior of 
the poor in the rural areas in Bangladesh (Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2006). The results of regression analysis 
demonstrate that among the six demographic and other explanatory variables, five and six are found statistically 
significant respectively to influence the dropping out behavior of the rural borrowers of the MFIs (see the Table 
IV). Some of the significant variables are found to be negatively correlated as well. These outcomes are also 
consistent with the correlation matrix in the Table III. 
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Table II Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Gender (X1) 280 1.00 2.00 1.3000 .45908 
Age (X2) 280 1.00 4.00 2.2393 .81862 
Education (X3) 280 1.00 4.00 1.6036 .85299 
Yearly Income (X4) 280 1.00 5.00 3.2536 1.39250 
Total Land (X5) 280 1.00 5.00 2.2036 1.15687 
Other Assets (X6) 280 1.00 5.00 2.5357 1.75328 
Fear (X7) 280 1.00 5.00 3.0857 .97182 
Preference (X8) 280 1.00 5.00 2.5750 .69670 
Religion (X9) 280 1.25 5.00 3.9527 .92324 
Female (X10) 280 1.00 5.00 4.1893 .95032 
Friend (X11) 280 .75 3.75 2.3759 .51020 
Resource (X12) 280 1.00 5.00 3.2795 .72819 
Knowledge (X13) 280 1.00 5.00 3.4937 1.23556 
Illness (X14) 280 1.00 5.00 4.0071 .99548 
Dropping Outs (Y) 280 1.00 5.00 2.6107 1.67692 
      
 
Table III Correlation Matrix 
 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 
X1 
 
- 
             
X2 -.14 
(*) 
-             
X3 .12 
(*) 
.34 
(**) 
-            
X4 -.14 
(*) 
.07 -.02 -           
X5 -.16 
(** 
.12 -.05 .46 
(**) 
-          
X6 -.14 
(*) 
.18 
(**) 
-.14 
(*) 
.14 
(*) 
.07 -         
X7 -.03 -03 -.06 
 
-.02 .12 .02 -        
X8 .01 .06 -.09 
 
.16 
(**) 
.07 -.02 .10 -       
X9 -.11 -.03 -.10 
 
.12 .24 
(**) 
.02 .59 
(**) 
.03 -      
X10 -.05 .15 
(*) 
.06 -.00 .04 .04 .19 
(**) 
-.08 .27 
(**) 
-     
X11 -.11 -.02 
 
-.02 .08 .04 .00 -.05 .07 -.04 .11 -    
X12 .04 -.24 
(**) 
-.05 .01 .01 .07 -.26 
(**) 
-.20 
(**) 
-.14 
(*) 
-.06 -.02 -   
X13 -.23 
(**) 
-.33 
(**) 
-.17 
(**) 
.04 -.03 .25 
(**) 
.11 -.16 
(**) 
.18 
(**) 
-.13 
(*) 
.00 .32 
(**) 
-  
X14 -.01 -.43 
(**) 
-.1 -.11 -.09 .19 
(**) 
-.15 
(*) 
.26 
(**) 
-.08 -.05 -.03 .49 
(**) 
.39 
(**) 
- 
Y -.1 -.29 
(**) 
.1 -.38 
(**) 
-.31 
(**) 
.4 
(**) 
.26 
(**) 
-.17 
(**) 
.20 
(**) 
-.14 
(*) 
-.06 -.08 .44 
(**) 
.28 
(**) 
 
* indicates significance at p < 0.05 level 
** indicate significance at p < 0.01 level 
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Several past research have reported that female borrowers’ dropping out tendency is less than the male 
borrowers of the MFIs. In the present study, the majority of the borrowers are female (about 86 percent) and the 
regression coefficient for gender is found negatively significant (p < .01) which is consistent with the past 
research evidence. This outcome is also consistent with the results of negative correlation between gender and 
dropping out (see in the correlation matrix in the Table III).  
 
Table IV Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
      
Gender (X1) -.185 .035 -.246 -5.311 .000 
Age (X2) -.039 .023 -.085 -1.703 .089 
Education (X3) .089 .022 .187 4.005 .000 
Total yearly income (X4) -.011 .014 -.039 -.806 .420 
Total amount of land (X5) -.035 .015 -.116 -2.387 .017 
Other assets (X6)  .044 .010 .200 4.323 .000 
Fear of risk (X7) .056 .022 .135 2.568 .011 
Preference (X8) .055 .023 .108 2.425 .016 
Religious constraints (X9) -.056 .023 -.128 -2.442 .015 
Female head (X10) .048 .019 .115 2.501 .013 
Friends’ advice (X11) -.011 .022 -.021 -.492 .623 
Resources inadequacy (X12) -.046 .025 -.091 -1.801 .072 
Lack of Knowledge (X13) -.053 .017 -.164 -3.123 .002 
Illness (X14) .004 .019 .012 .234 .815 
 
     
Dependent Variable: Dropping outs; Adjusted R2 = 0.17; F = 5.074** (14, 265) 
 
The variable of age is also found to be negatively statistically significant at p< .10 percent level. This implies 
that the younger borrowers have a greater tendency to be inclined to dropout from the microfinance borrowing 
system. Education is appeared to be positively and highly statistically significant (p < .01) which may be due to 
the fact that dropping out behavior is significantly more for the educated and more aware borrowers. Though the 
factor of the total yearly household income of the borrowers are not statistically significant, the sign of the 
regression coefficient is appeared to be negative which implies that the more the yearly income, the less 
possibility of dropping out from the MFIs. As many dropping out behavior are observed due to default of 
repayment of the loan installments, higher income may reduce the probability of this default incidence. The 
variable of the total amount of land is also found negatively statistically significant at p < .05 level. This fact is 
equally likely happened in the case of the borrowers who possess comparatively less land and they are prone to 
have more probability to be default of loan repayment.  
In the survey, it is that more than half of the borrowers are landless and near landless (about 62 percent of which 
20 percent landless and 42 percent near landless), the fact of which is evidently consistent with the Agricultural 
Census (1983-84) of Bangladesh (BBS, 1986). According to Hossain (1986), the number of landless and near 
landless households has increased at a rate of about 3.0 percent per annum as compared to a 2.0 percent growth 
in the number of rural household. The value other assets excluding land is also appeared to be positively and 
highly statistically significant (p <.01). 
Among the eight demand-side factors six are observed to be statistically significant to influence the dropping out 
behavior of the rural poor in Bangladesh. The variable of lack of knowledge is found statistically significant at 
the p< .01 level and resource inadequacy is observed to be statistically significant at the p<.10 level. The other 
four variables are appeared to be statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Four of the six significant variables 
are found to be negatively influencing the dropping out behavior of the rural borrowers. These variables are 
religious constraints, friends’ advice, resource inadequacy and lack of knowledge.  
Evidence in the past research confirms that religious restrictions are a robust negative impetus in the ethno-
centric rural society of Bangladesh where the majority of the population is Islamic (Ashraf, 2013). In Islam, 
interest is seen as a tool of exploitation which is completely forbidden in its core values. In this respect, this 
factor is realistically relevant to show its nomenclature in enhancing the dropping out behavior. High interest 
rates of microfinance are also associated with high-risk which deters the rural poor to borrow microfinance from 
the MFIs. The extreme poor do not have the ability to have risk which may cause to sporadic suicidal incidence 
that happened in northern Bangladesh in the recent past (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). Such tragedies are largely 
ascribed upon high interest rates which trap the borrowers into a never-ending loop. Since these types of 
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incidences are spreading trauma (fear) in the minds of the general people in the rural areas (Datta, 2004, 
Hashemi, 1997), friends and neighbors used to advice to stop borrowing from the MFIs. Hence, fear of getting 
into risk of microfinance and friends’ negative advice may cause to dropping out from the microfinance scheme.   
 
Due to ethno-centric background of Bangladesh, the rural society is profoundly constrained by the Islamic 
religious codes which nullify the female socialization without veil and seldom prefer female head of the 
household (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). Thus, owing to the compliance of religious restrictions, one may leave the 
MFIs for ever. There has been such evidence that in areas where religious conservatism is very high, even 
women of extreme poor families do not want to join to or to remain in the groups because of social and religious 
sanctions. These sanctions dictate that remaining in credit programs and leaving the home for meetings with 
other men is inappropriate (Datta, 2004). Thus, the results of the present study is realistically conforming the 
religious background of the rural Bangladesh.   
 
The market of microfinance has now become very competitive in rural areas, since thousands of NGO-MFIs 
have been operating in Bangladesh (Ashraf, 2013; Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). As a result of this competitive 
market environment of microfinance, the space for the choice of the rural clients has now become much wider 
which opens the door for overlapping of multiple loans. Preference of individual member for selecting the MFIs 
in the present study is found to be statistically significant influencing the dropping out behavior. This becomes 
possible only because there have been of multiple microlending institutions. Dropping out from one institution is 
not ultimately the dead-end from which there is no way out to have further loans for meeting up a dire need. In 
this situation, individual preference may deem to be a catalyst for encouraging dropping out behavior of the rural 
poor. 
Resource inadequacy and lack of proper knowledge of business and money management skills are also found 
statistically significant to influence the dropping out behavior of the rural poor in the present study. The majority 
of MFIs require that borrowers attend the group meetings, pay service charge, deposit mandatory savings and 
undertake educational and planning activities. As all these deem scarce, any of the requirements may become 
impossible to meet up (Ashraf, 2013; Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Lack of knowledge also impedes the ability of 
borrowers to understand the benefits of credit, function within a peer group, and successfully use credit. Finally, 
dropping out might simply be a function of individual or household preferences that deem that credit is not in 
their best short or long-term interest (Evans, Adams, Mohammed and Norris, 1999). Thus, these evidences 
conform to the outcomes of the present study which aims to identify the potential reasons of dropping out from 
MFIs in Bangladesh.   
 
Conclusion 
As the present research aims to identify the potential factors that are responsible for dropping out of the rural 
poor from membership of the MFIs, the study collects data from the six districts of Bangladesh from 280 
respondents who are currently dropped out from borrowing microfinance. The study includes six demographic 
variables in addition to eight demand-side factors as explanatory variables which may influence the dropping out 
behavior of the dropped-out rural poor. The results of multiple regression analysis demonstrate that eleven of 
fourteen independent variables are observed to be statistically significant to influence the dropping out behavior 
of the rural poor. As the nonparticipation and the dropping out are being emerged to be important problem in 
microfinance scheme, the findings of this research may help to reduce the problem.    
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